As things began to move in the right direction in more than five-decade-old civil war, a concerted right-wing effort combined with a skeptical population and less than persuasive argument by the government helped lead to the defeat of a landmark peace deal between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, in an October 2, 2016, national referendum.
To begin with, it was a high-risk, high-stakes move on behalf of Juan Manuel Santos to open negotiation with the largest rebel group of Colombia soon after assuming presidency in 2011. The intense negotiation that has ensued over the next five years at Havana yielded an agreement on August 24, 2016. The deal was announced with much fanfare by the chief negotiators of the government and FARC, Humberto de la Calle and Ivan Marquez, respectively, with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguz basking in the glow of a successful mediator to bring warring sides to reconciliation after 52 years of an intractable civil war that had killed at least 220,000 people and displaced at least 5 million. The following day, August 25, 2016, Colombian President Santos hand-delivered the 297-page agreement to Congress and called a nationwide vote on the deal for October 2, 2016. Juan Manuel Santos staked his personal reputation and legacy on approving the deal in nationwide referendum and bring one of the oldest civil war to a logical end. In recognition to his tireless effort, this year's (2016) Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Juan Manuel Santos although his signature achievement received a jolt in the poll, with 50.25 percent of the voters saying NO to the deal.
Failure of the deal in nationwide vote forebodes an uncertain political future for this Latin American nation. Although there are many fingers pointing at the president for blame, it was undeniable that all the right-wing groups had ganged up prior to the polls behind former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. Uribe's prescription to bring peace was hinged on defeating and destroying FARC by military means. Most of these right-wing political parties and their leaders saw the very deal as the one having the potential set back their political future. They propagated effectively, days before the referendum, that this deal would pardon the crimes of FARC and provide the guerrilla leaders a golden opportunity to rule the country one day. They effectively reopened the old wound by reminding millions of Colombians who had been directly, or indirectly, impacted by the FARC brutalities--although there were voluminous reports of excesses and abuses perpetrated by the military and right-wing paramilitary too--and convinced them that FARC was actually being rewarded for the brutalities of the past. The pro-deal campaign was driven with less than persuasive logic, while the NO campaign in the run-up to the polls were driven by raw emotion, fear mongering and portrayal of a dark future.
Now, Colombia must deal with the fallout of the unexpected outcome of the vote. This is also a setback to Obama administration's policy to bring Colombian civil war to an end. Apparently the famous comment by Bernard Aronson, the chief U.S. envoy to Colombian peace talks, on June 23, 2016 that the "finish line has been defined" in the Colombian civil war seems now overoptimistic. Obama administration's pledge of $460 million a year is now in a limbo. An emboldened Alvaro Uribe and his allies will try to put hurdles every step to roll back the gains and positive political landscape that has arisen out the deal. Juan Manuel Santos more than ever needs to be assertive and persuasive to push forward toward implementing the deal. International community should provide moral support to Juan Manuel Santos' effort to end the civil war. FARC should keep in mind that what it didn't achieve militarily had almost won it without firing a single shot, and resorting to old-style guerrilla war against the state would be a mistake of disastrous proportion. Although the October 2, 2016, vote was a setback to the Colombian peace process, not all was lost. All parties should work hard, including Juan Manuel Santos to reach out to Uribe, try more determinedly to bring the process back on track, and revisit and renegotiate the deal if that's what it takes to save it from complete collapse.
To begin with, it was a high-risk, high-stakes move on behalf of Juan Manuel Santos to open negotiation with the largest rebel group of Colombia soon after assuming presidency in 2011. The intense negotiation that has ensued over the next five years at Havana yielded an agreement on August 24, 2016. The deal was announced with much fanfare by the chief negotiators of the government and FARC, Humberto de la Calle and Ivan Marquez, respectively, with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguz basking in the glow of a successful mediator to bring warring sides to reconciliation after 52 years of an intractable civil war that had killed at least 220,000 people and displaced at least 5 million. The following day, August 25, 2016, Colombian President Santos hand-delivered the 297-page agreement to Congress and called a nationwide vote on the deal for October 2, 2016. Juan Manuel Santos staked his personal reputation and legacy on approving the deal in nationwide referendum and bring one of the oldest civil war to a logical end. In recognition to his tireless effort, this year's (2016) Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Juan Manuel Santos although his signature achievement received a jolt in the poll, with 50.25 percent of the voters saying NO to the deal.
Failure of the deal in nationwide vote forebodes an uncertain political future for this Latin American nation. Although there are many fingers pointing at the president for blame, it was undeniable that all the right-wing groups had ganged up prior to the polls behind former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. Uribe's prescription to bring peace was hinged on defeating and destroying FARC by military means. Most of these right-wing political parties and their leaders saw the very deal as the one having the potential set back their political future. They propagated effectively, days before the referendum, that this deal would pardon the crimes of FARC and provide the guerrilla leaders a golden opportunity to rule the country one day. They effectively reopened the old wound by reminding millions of Colombians who had been directly, or indirectly, impacted by the FARC brutalities--although there were voluminous reports of excesses and abuses perpetrated by the military and right-wing paramilitary too--and convinced them that FARC was actually being rewarded for the brutalities of the past. The pro-deal campaign was driven with less than persuasive logic, while the NO campaign in the run-up to the polls were driven by raw emotion, fear mongering and portrayal of a dark future.
Now, Colombia must deal with the fallout of the unexpected outcome of the vote. This is also a setback to Obama administration's policy to bring Colombian civil war to an end. Apparently the famous comment by Bernard Aronson, the chief U.S. envoy to Colombian peace talks, on June 23, 2016 that the "finish line has been defined" in the Colombian civil war seems now overoptimistic. Obama administration's pledge of $460 million a year is now in a limbo. An emboldened Alvaro Uribe and his allies will try to put hurdles every step to roll back the gains and positive political landscape that has arisen out the deal. Juan Manuel Santos more than ever needs to be assertive and persuasive to push forward toward implementing the deal. International community should provide moral support to Juan Manuel Santos' effort to end the civil war. FARC should keep in mind that what it didn't achieve militarily had almost won it without firing a single shot, and resorting to old-style guerrilla war against the state would be a mistake of disastrous proportion. Although the October 2, 2016, vote was a setback to the Colombian peace process, not all was lost. All parties should work hard, including Juan Manuel Santos to reach out to Uribe, try more determinedly to bring the process back on track, and revisit and renegotiate the deal if that's what it takes to save it from complete collapse.
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